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INTRODUCTION
During the Kosovo campaign the press reported an alleged plan for a
computer-based strike on [Serbian President] Milosevic's personal bank
accounts. Later stories indicated that legal concerns were one reason the
cyberassault was aborted. If such a plan existed, the legal issues might
include the fact that absent a showing, for example, that the monies are
being used to directly support a military effort, the Law of Armed
Conflict ("LOAC") would not permit raiding Milosevic's personal
accounts. I
The law of war would preclude an action that targeted the
financial accounts of an enemy's leader, unless the accounts directly
supported the war effort. Presumably, this is because personal bank
accounts are traditionally civilian property and not the subject of
military action.2 Further, under traditional methods and means of
warfare, the military assets of the opposing nation could not reach
these types of accounts. This is no longer true in today's armed
conflict.3 The evolution of computer network operations ("CNO"),
1. See Gregory L. Vistica, Cyberwar and Sabotage, NEWSWEEK, May 31,
1999, at 38, quoted in Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The End ofInnocence: Rethinking
Noncombatancy in the Post-Kosovo Era, STRATEGIC REVIEW 9, 13 (2000)
(citations omitted) (outlining the proposed use of cyber warfare in Kosovo and the
possible reasons the government rejected its use).
2. See Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century
Warfare, 2 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 143, 156-57 (1999) (claiming that modem
humanitarian law forbids the use of financial entities as military objection).
3. This paper will only discuss the application of computer network
operations against targets once armed conflict has begun, otherwise known as jus
in bello. See Richard W. Aldrich, How Do You Know You Are at War in the
Information Age?, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L 223 (2000) (discussing potential
employment of computer network operations prior to armed conflict, or jus ad
bellum). See generally Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National
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and computer network attacks ("CNA")4 in particular, has vastly
expanded the capabilities of today's commander and has
Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right to Self-Defense, 38 STAN J.
INT'L L. 207 (2002) (positing that attacks on critical national infrastructure should
be considered armed attacks under the United Nations Charter); Todd A. Morth,
Note, Considering Our Position: Viewing Information Warfare as a Use of Force
Prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 567
(1998) (comparing Information Warfare capabilities to those of nuclear, chemical
and biological attacks in destructive capability but contrasting them by the ease
with which they can be attained); Michael J. Robbat, Note, Resolving the Legal
Issues Concerning the Use of Information Warfare in the International Forum:
The Reach of the Existing Legal Framework, and the Creation of a New Paradigm,
6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 10, Part IV (2000) (proposing an international
convention with the intent to proclaim CNA and other forms of information
warfare as an "armed use of force" and provide for universal cooperation and
extradition); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force
in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L 885 (arguing that determinations of use of force for a computer
network attack should be based on the consequences of the attack, not the method);
WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 101 (1999)
(asserting that an attack across cyberspace resulting in no physical damage should
be considered a use of force).
4. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB 3-13, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 1-9 (Oct. 9, 1998) (defining computer network attack
as "[o]perations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves"),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new-pubs/jp3-l3.pdf (last visited
Mar. 19, 2003). Computer Network Operations include such things as CNA and
computer network defense. See generally DOROTHY E. DENNING, INFORMATION
WARFARE AND SECURITY (2000). A detailed description of these techniques is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, a brief introduction to some standard
hacker tools is valuable as a baseline for the discussion that follows. A Trojan
horse is a "program that, when activated, performs some undesirable action not
anticipated by the person running it. It could delete files, reformat a disk, or leak
sensitive data back to its author." Id. at 259. A logic bomb, or time bomb, is a
Trojan horse that is "triggered by some event."Id.
A virus is a fragment of code that attaches itself to other computer
instructions, including software application code.., performs some function
and then turns control over to its host... The resident copy watches for
uninfected hosts... [and] inserts a copy of itself in the host. The virus may
then execute a 'payload,' which can do anything from displaying an amusing
or political message to wiping out files on the hard drive . . . A worm is a
program that propagates from one computer to another over a computer
network by breaking into the computers in much the way that a hacker would
break into them. Unlike viruses, they do not get any help from unwitting
users. They must find a computer they can penetrate, carry out an attack, and
transfer a replica of their code to the target host for execution. In effect, a
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subsequently expanded the targets he can now attack.5 As the
battlefield has changed from a linear front to a three-dimensional
battlespace, the potential targets have also changed.6. This change is
reflected not only in the quantity of targets available based on
extended ranges, but in the nature of the targets, as reflected by the
example of an attack on Milosevic's private bank accounts.7 This
expansion of the commander's potential target list has caused some
to cast doubt on the ability of the commander to adequately apply the
traditional principles of the law of war such as distinction, military
necessity and humanity, as well as proportionality, when using CNO.
In response to this expanded lethal reach, particularly in the case
of CNA, some have proposed new international agreements8 or a
worm completely automates the steps taken by a computer intruder who hops
from one system to the next.
Id. at 269-70, 280.
Denial of service attacks deny legitimate users access to information
sources by destroying data or disrupting operations. Id. at 231 Code Breaking
means "acquiring access to the plaintext of encrypted data by some means other
than the normal decryption process used by the intended recipient(s) of the data.
Code breaking is achieved either by obtaining the decryption key through a special
key recovery service or by finding the key through cryptanalysis." Id. at 408; see
also Dr. Ivan K. Goldberg, Glossary of Information Warfare Terms (providing a
full glossary of cyber war terms), available at http://www.psycom.net/iwar.2.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2003); William B. Scott, Goal for "Cyber Warrior"
Training: Sharper Hacker Tactic Knowledge, 157 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., No. 10, Sept. 2, 2002, at 60 (outlining the two-day "Cyber Warrior" course
and providing estimated numbers of cyber attacks).
5. See David A. Fulgham, Infowar to Invade Air Defense Networks, 157
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., No. 19, Nov. 4, 2002, at 30 (quoting General
John Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff as saying, "I've talked often about the fact
that we're rapidly approaching the time when you can tell an SA-10's [surface to
air missile system] radar that it's a Maytag washer and put it in the rinse cycle
instead of the firing cycle").
6. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 162 (noting that civilians become targets in
the new battlefield).
7. See Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare. Computer Network Attack and Jus
in Bello, 84 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 365, 365 (No. 864 2002) (listing
examples of different operations that can affect information systems), available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList501/E4E4AO3DE3BE 1211 C 125
6BF900332F62 (last visited Mar. 19, 2003).
8. See Mark R. Shulman, Discrimination in the Laws of Information Warfare,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 939, 964-65 (1999) (proposing a model protocol to
codify the application of standard humanitarian principles to information
operations); see also William J. Bayles, The Ethics of Computer Network Attack,
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shift in the standard focus of analysis to accommodate the unique
aspects of CNA,9 including the potential for second and third tier
effects known as "knock-on" effects.' 0  These changes are
unnecessary. Commanders need only apply the traditional analysis
(including the principle of distinction), the balance between military
necessity and humanity, and the principle of proportionality to ensure
that they correctly apply this new technology during armed conflict.
This is even true in the case of objects that serve both a military and
civilian purpose, or dual-use objects."
Further, as commanders consider the expanded target list offered
by CNA capabilities, particularly the potential secondary, tertiary, or
"knock-on" effects, there is concern about possible violations of the
principle of distinction and the rule of proportionality. 2 While the
potential for these unexpected consequences does exist and may have
some unique aspects in CNO, they do not present irresolvable legal
issues. Rather, the commander can look to the same law and
principles that apply to all military operations. He may use CNA if,
in good faith, he believes that the damage to civilian objects and
injury to civilians that is expected from the attack, including
potential "knock-on" effects, given the circumstances as known to
PARAMETERS 44, 55 (2001) (calling for the creation of new international law
conventions to deal with Electronic Means of Mass Disruption ("EMMD")),
available at http://Carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01spring/bayles.htm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2003).
9. See Schmitt, supra note 3, at 886 (addressing the various methodologies
that may be used to address CNA attacks).
10. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 392-94 (defining "knock-on effects" and
providing an often cited example of these effects).
11. See Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Facade: A Critical Look at the
Current Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air force Doctrine, 51 A.F.
L. REV. 143, 178 (2001) (outlining the inherent long-term effects that may result
from hitting dual-use objects).
12. See Andrew Koch, USA Gears Up For Cyberwar, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Jan.
29, 2003 (quoting Major General John Bradley, Deputy Commander of Joint Task
Force - Computer Network Operations). The General stated:
The main issue is: can you be very precise and do exactly what you say you
can do and not have any other problems - no unintended
consequences? ... We spend a huge amount of time concentrating on
CNA... making sure you don't do something you are not intending to do.
We are going down this road carefully.
2003] 1149
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him at the time after taking all feasible measures to ascertain those
circumstances, is not excessive to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.
Part I of this paper will analyze whether the traditional rules of the
law of war, formed during the long-established linear battle era, give
sufficient guidance to a commander contemplating a CNA. The
paper will contend that though the laws of war were formed during
an era that did not contemplate instantaneous lethality through
electronic transmission from a computer thousands of miles from the
potential target, they can still be applied with accuracy and
pertinence today. Part II closely examines the legal constraints to the
offensive use of CNA and its potential problem of "knock-on"
effects leading to unexpected consequences. If properly analyzed,
this paper will then demonstrate that the legal standard when
considering potential unexpected consequences is no different in
CNO than in normal kinetic operations and presents no significant
addition to the standard targeting analysis.
I. TRADITIONAL RULES OF WAR AND THE CNA
Once two nations are in armed conflict with each other, the law of
war applies. 3 The two nations are still bound by peacetime
13. See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2 opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 305 (1 st ed. 1981) (stating that the "trigger" for the law of war
to apply is international armed conflict or conflict "between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties [to the Geneva Conventions], even if the state of war is
not recognized between them"); see also Convention (II) for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, art. 2, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85,
reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra, at 333; Convention (III) Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra, at 355;
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art.
2, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287, reprinted
in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra, at 427. This statement, known as common Article
2 because it is common to all four Geneva Conventions, is in contrast to "armed
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties" which is found in Article 3 of all four Geneva
Conventions and is known as common Article 3. Id. The full body of the law of
war applies to common Article 2 conflicts, whereas a much smaller and less
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agreements to the extent that they are not obviously superseded by
hostilities 14 or suspended between the warring states. "5 They continue
to be bound by customary international law, 6 but they are also bound
by the unique body of customary and conventional law 7 that applies
"to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties [to
the Geneva Conventions], even if the state of war is not recognized
between them."' 8
Within this body of law, also known as the law of armed conflict,
three fundamental principles guide a commander in determining
what targets he can attack: 1) Distinction, 2) Balancing Military
Necessity with Humanity, and 3) Proportionality. 9 These principles
have developed over centuries of warfare and have been codified in
conventional law that requires a commander to consider them
appropriately as he conducts military operations in international
encompassing set of rights apply to individuals participating in common Article 3
conflicts. See W. Michael Reisman and James Silk, Which Law Applies to the
Afghan Conflict?, 82 A.J.I.L. 459 (July 1988) (outlining the provisions of common
Articles II and III and discussing the differences between the two); see also
Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239,
260 (2000) (addressing the qualifications of conflicts and the applicability
thresholds of common Articles 2 and 3).
14. See DEP'T OF DEF. OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, AN ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL
ISSUES IN INFO. OPERATIONS, 3 (2d ed. Nov. 1999) (explaining that hostilities may
supersede the treaty's ultimate objective).
15. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, , art. 54-
64,8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (providing regulations for treaty termination
or suspension) available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH538.txt (last
visited Mar. 19, 2003).
16. See Custom, 1 HACKWORTH DIG. § 3, at 15-17 (outlining basic tenets of
customary international law).
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE 4 - 8 (1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10] (detailing the applicable laws of
war).
18. See supra note 13 (discussing when the law of war correctly applies to a
conflict).
19. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, NWP 1-14M, COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Oct. 1995) (defining these three principles
further as: "1) The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited, 2) It is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as
such, and 3) Distinctions must be made between combatants and noncombatants,
to the effect that noncombatants be spared as much as possible").
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armed conflict. The initial question for this paper is whether these
principles are still valid and whether their application is effective in
light of new technologies.
A. DISTINCTION
One of the fundamental principles of the law of war is the
requirement for a commander to distinguish between military and
civilian objects, including populations, when selecting targets to
engage. As stated in the preamble to the 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, "[t]he only legitimate
object, which States should endeavor to accomplish during war, is to
weaken the military forces of the enemy."20 The underlying
assumption is that civilian populations, as well as civilian objects,
should not be the object of attack unless they "participate directly in
hostilities"2' or somehow become part of the military forces. This
principle is confirmed in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflict ("GPI").2 1 The general rule
regarding distinction during an armed conflict is found in Article 48,
which states "[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
20. St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29, 1868, reprinted in
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 13, at 96 [hereinafter St. Petersburg's
Declaration].
21. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, Dec. 7,
1978, art. 43, para. 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter GPI]. The United States
recognizes portions of GPI as customary international law. See Michael J.
Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary Law to the
1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. Univ. J. Int'l L.
& Pol'y 419 (1987) (discussing which articles of GPI the United States believes
are customary international law and to which the United States objects).
22. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 43, 1125 U.N.T.S. 22 (dictating when citizens
become part of the armed forces).
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objectives. 23 Several articles that follow this provision expand on
these terms and the application of this protection.
GPI Article 51 pronounces rules intended to protect civilians from
the dangers arising from military operations. 24 Not only does it
23. Id. art. 48, 1125 U.N.T.S. 25. The United States accepts Article 48 as
customary international law. See Matheson, supra note 21, at 426 (supporting the
idea that customary international law encompasses much of Part IV and believing
it necessary to distinguish between armed forces and civilians).
24. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26. GPI Article 51 states:
Article 51-Protection of the civilian population
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to
this protection, the following rules, which are additional to other applicable
rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be
the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which
is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those, which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such
case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian
objects without distinction.
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military
objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar
concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.
6. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are
prohibited.
7. The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual
civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from
military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from
attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the
conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual
civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to
shield military operations.
2003] 1153
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preclude making civilians the "object of attack"25 unless they take a
"direct part"2 6 in hostilities, but it also precludes attacks that are
unable to discriminate or focus on a particular military object.27 This
means the commander is required not only to use weapons that can
distinguish by their nature and be focused on a particular target, but
also that in using any weapon, a commander must use it in a way that
distinguishes between civilian and military objects.28
GPI Article 52 provides similar protections for civilian objects.
29
The test for civilian objects is whether their "nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
8. Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the
conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and
civilians, including the obligation to take the precautionary measures
provided for in Article 57.
Id.
25. Id. para. 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 5 (listing the actions prohibited against
civilians).
26. Id. para. 3, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 6 (remarking on exceptions to the prohibition
on targeting civilians).
27. See id. para. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 6 (defining what is meant by an
"indiscriminate attack").
28. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 388 (specifying that regardless of application,
the weapon or tactic must distinguish between combatant and civilian objectives).
29. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 52, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27. Article 52 of the GPI
states:
Article 52-General protection of civilian objects.
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian
objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in
paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects
are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is
being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be
presumed not to be so used.
1154 [18:1145
ATTACKS ON COMPUTER NETWORKS
advantage."3 The commander who contemplates attacking a civilian
object must satisfy both prongs of the test 3' in order to overcome the
law of war preclusion against attacking civilian objects.32 The first
part of this test is the distinction analysis. The commander must
decide whether the normally civilian object has been transformed
into a military objective.33 If so, he continues to the second portion of
the analysis, requiring him to determine the military necessity of
attacking that target. This principle will be further discussed below.
34
Growing out of this protection of civilians and civilian objects,
Article 57 of the GPI discusses specific steps that military leaders
should take when attacking military forces in order to help
accomplish this protection. 31 Paragraph 2 requires a commander to
30. See id. art. 52, para. 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27 (explaining in the Commentary
that the "nature" aspect of the test is defined as "all objects directly used by the
armed forces: weapons, equipment, transports, fortifications, depots, buildings
occupied by armed forces, staff headquarters, communications centers etc");
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, para. 2020 (Y. Sandoz, et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter GPI
COMMENTARY]. "Location" may turn a civilian object into a military object if, for
example, it is a bridge or other construction, or... a site which is of special
importance for military operations in view of its location, either because it is a site
that must be seized or because it is important to prevent the enemy from seizing it,
or otherwise because it is a matter of forcing the enemy to retreat from it. Id. para.
2021. "The criterion of 'purpose' is concerned with the intended future use of an
object, while that of 'use' is concerned with its present function. Id. para. 2022.
31. Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Principle of the Military Objective in the
Law of Armed Conflict, 8 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL. STUD. 35, 40 (1997/1998)
(discussing the two-pronged test of GPI Article 52).
32. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 2018.
33. See id. para. 2020 (noting how objects can be turned into military targets
depending on how they are used).
34. See infra Part I.C.
35. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 57, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 30. GPI Article 57 states:
Article 57-Precautions in attack.
1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
(a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection
but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52
and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them;
2003] 1155
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
verify that the object is not civilian in nature.36 Further, if an attack
has already been launched and circumstances change such that a
previously legitimate target is no longer valid, the commander is
required to suspend or cancel the attack.37
Complicating the practical application of these rules allows the
potential for movement of civilian objects into and out of the military
objective definition. Objects that are otherwise civilian in nature
may, on a temporary basis, become a military object based on
(ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack
with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
(iii) Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(b) An attack shall be canceled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated;
(c) Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining
a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the
attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives
and to civilian objects.
4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the
conflict shall, in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions
to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.
5. No provision of this Article may be construed as authorizing any attacks
against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.
ld; see also Matheson, supra note 21, at 426-27 (stating that the United States has
no specific objections to this article and believes it reflects customary international
law).
36. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 57, para. 2(a)(i), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29
(mandating that military leaders take all feasible measures to verify that the targets
for attack are not civilians or civilian objects).
37. See id. art. 57, para. 2(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29 (requiring military leaders to
cancel or suspend an attack upon discovering that the target is not a military
object).
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location, purpose, or use." For example, a bridge that normally
carries civilian traffic and would be considered a civilian object
would become a military objective based on its location if it became
the means for the enemy's armed forces to move to the battle. While
still serving as a primary means for civilian transport over the river,
the bridge is now a military object, as it is the primary means for the
military to cross that same river.39 Objects like this are known as
dual-use objects; objects that simultaneously serve civilian and
military objectives.4" These dual-use objects present a unique
challenge for commanders.
For example, assume a commander has information that a train
depot is being used as a major hub for military transport of supplies
and personnel. The commander is contemplating an attack on the
train depot, but knows it is located within a populated area and also
services civilian trains. Under these circumstances, the train depot is
a dual-use object because it normally services civilian and
commercial rail transport, but the military also uses it for military
purposes. This use makes the depot a legitimate military objective.
However, just because the rail depot is a military object, the
commander still has the requirement to try to limit his attack to the
military portions of the rail depot, if possible.4 For example, if the
commander knows that there are two particular areas of military
concentration within this rail depot, he must attempt to limit his
attack to those areas and distinguish between them and the other
portions of the rail depot that are not currently serving a military
purpose.
This principle of distinction must be a key element in the
commander's analysis during normal military operations. As will be
38. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 2021, 2022 (noting how the
GPI distinguishes purely civilian objects from those that can be viewed as military
objectives).
39. See id. at para. 2020 (explaining that objects which by their very nature
make an effective contribution to military action are deemed military objects).
40. See Meyer, supra note 11, at 178 (describing the concept of dual-use
targets).
41. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 57, para. 2(a)(ii), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29
(requiring military personnel to take "all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack" to avoid or minimize damage to civilian objects).
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explained below, the principle of distinction is equally important,
and perhaps more so, when conducting computer network operations.
B. DISTINCTION IN CNA
Because of the potential for new targets afforded by computer
capabilities, traditional methodologies have come under attack as
insufficient to protect noncombatants in this era of increased
technological weaponry. 42 To truly distinguish between civilian and
military objects in an attack can be problematic. 3 This makes
distinction one of the most difficult current issues in CNA. Unlike
traditional methods of warfare, in order to employ CNA, a
commander will likely have to involve civilian objects, such as
communication systems, to successfully accomplish his attack. In
fact, " [ninety-five] percent of the U.S. military traffic mov[es] over
civilian telecommunications and computer systems. ' '44 This means
that some civilian systems will be used, even if only to facilitate a
CNA 5 Unless an attack originates on a Department of Defense
42. See Shulman, supra note 8, at 941 (discussing some problems and
suggesting some guidelines for retaining discrimination as an international norm in
the information age).
43. For the analysis in this paper, it is assumed that the military action amounts
to an attack. Where there is a use of CNA, there is legitimate doubt that many of
the currently proposed uses of CNO in a conflict would amount to an "attack," as
defined in the GPI. For an excellent discussion on this issue, see Schmitt, supra
note 7, at 375-78 (discussing the significance of the word "attack" and arguing that
to meet the definition of attack, the action must be intended to cause, or
foreseeably cause, injury, death, damage, or destruction). While conducting a CNA
may not amount to an attack under Schmitt's definition, it is almost certainly a
military operation encompassed under Article 49 of the GPI. See GPI, supra note
21, art. 49, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25 (defining "attacks" as "acts of violence against the
adversary, whether in offense or in defence").
44. Arnaud de Borchgrave et al., Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Cyber Threats and Information Security Meeting the 21" Century Challenge, at 10
(2000) (arguing that the United States is vulnerable to cyber attacks due to a severe
reliance on information systems), available at
http://www.csis.org/homeland/reports/cyberthreatsandinfosec.pdf (last visited Mar.
19, 2003).
45. See James P. Terry, The Lawfulness of Attacking Computer Networks in
Armed Conflict and in Self-Defense in Periods Short of Armed Conflict: What are
the Targeting Constraints? 169 MIL. L. REV. 70, 88 (2001) (discussing the
International Telecommunications Convention and arguing that Article 38 of the
International Telecommunications Convention of 1982 ("ITC") provides an
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("DOD") computer and travels solely over military communications
equipment to an enemy's military communications network,
46 it will
at some point be conducted by some medium that is civilian in nature
and therefore, involve civilian objects.
47
In addition to facilitating either an operation or an attack over a
civilian communication medium, other civilian objects are likely to
be the military objective of a CNA during an armed conflict, such as
Milosevic's bank account mentioned at the opening of this article.
These objects of attack may include facilities that are normally
civilian, but through their location, purpose, or use, become legal
military objectives. 48 As the commander considers this enlarged
target list, he will have the capability to attack additional targets that
he could not previously reach. In the case of CNA, these targets will
likely be dual-use targets, because they serve both military and
civilian purposes. 49 Civilian objects that may fall into this dual-use
exception for military transmissions from the general rule prohibiting member
states from interfering with the communications of other members). Thus, Article
38 authorizes information operations over foreign telecommunications systems.
See id. The potential legal issue still remains that the preclusion in Article 52(1) of
the GPI against making civilian objects the "object of attack" will be deemed to
include using civilian objects as the means or method of attack. See GPI, supra
note 21, art. 52, para. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 27 (mandating that "civilian objects shall
not be the object of attack or of reprisals"). Yet, under current international law
and the law of war, there is no prohibition against conducting CNAs over civilian
systems so long as the final destination is a valid military target and the attack
complies with the rule of proportionality. See DEP'T OF DEF. OFF. OF THE GEN.
COUNSEL, supra note 14, at 30-32 (discussing specific provisions of the ITC that
permit military interference of civilian communications in certain circumstances).
46. See PRESTON GRALLA, How THE INTERNET WORKS 9-15 (Millennium ed.
1999) (describing how information travels across the internet).
47. See Shulman, supra note 8, at 948 (stating "[t]he assailant will probably
route her assault through an innocent intermediary telecommunications systems").
"For example, a hacker would first route her communications through various
servers around the world before attempting to gain access to a DOD computer
system." Id. Further, in an attempt to protect its own CNA assets from active
enemy CNA responses, a nation is likely to purposefully send its CNAs through
various intermediary communication systems, many of which will likely be purely
civilian in nature. Id.
48. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (demonstrating how civilian
objects can become military targets).
49. See Meyer, supra note 11, at 178 (providing the common definition of
dual-use targets).
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category include: computer networks of certain research facilities, air
traffic control networks that regulate both civilian and military
aircraft, computerized civilian logistics systems upon Which military
supplies will be moved, electronic power grid control networks,
communications nodes and systems, including satellite and other
space-based systems, railroad and other transportation systems,
civilian government networks, and oil and gas distribution systems.
These targets may not only be lawful targets but may now be reached
in ways previously not available.50
Consider the fact that the U.S. military uses Microsoft Corporation
products to facilitate its communications, work product, and even its
CNA capabilities. Microsoft is not typically considered a defense
industry, rather its products are purchased by militaries as off-the-
shelf items. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that Microsoft
Corporation Headquarters in Washington State is a valid dual-use
target, based on the support it provides to the U.S. war effort by
facilitating U.S. military operations.51 The fact that the corporation
and its headquarters provide a product that the military finds
essential to function, as well as customer service to support that
product, may provide sufficient facts to conclude that it is a dual-use
target.
Applying existing rules, including the requirement for a definite
military advantage when targeting objects that serve both a military
and civilian use, a commander must be able to determine what
objects are legitimate targets of this increased capability. 2 Recent
50. See Michael N. Schmitt, Ethics and Military Force: The Jus in Bello,
Address Before the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs (Jan.
2002) (discussing additional targets that are available through CNA that were not
previously available, such as disrupting financial networks and altering data in
computerized medical records), available at
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplatelD=8&prmID=98
(last visited Mar. 19, 2003).
51. See Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-
First Century War and its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051, 1077 (1998) (questioning "would a Microsoft factory not
also offer an information dependent military definite enough advantage such that it
could be included on the Air Tasking Order?").
52. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 2024.
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successes of dual-use targeting 3 provide sufficient argument that the
already enlarged quantitative and qualitative borders of what
constitutes a legal target ought to be expanded even further. Given
the bloodless nature of CNA and its ability to affect armed conflict, it
can and should be a readily available weapon in the commander's
arsenal. Commanders should conduct the analysis on these and
similar targets, and use CNA assets against them, subject to there
being a military necessity to do so, and provided the attack will not
cause unnecessary civilian deaths, injury, or damage to civilian
property.
54
C. BALANCING MILITARY NECESSITY AND HUMANITY
Throughout history, militaries have generally acted with varying
degrees of limitation on their ability to wage war to accomplish their
purposes. In many cases, whatever means were necessary to
accomplish their assigned tasks were permissible.55 In other cases,
additional factors, such as the methods of war or the means used to
conduct war, were given consideration. 6 Though there were earlier
attempts,57 international efforts to limit certain means and methods of
warfare began to receive more attention in the nineteenth century, as
evidenced by The Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber and
53. See Dunlap, supra note 1, at 11 (arguing that the attack on dual-use
facilities was one of the keys to NATO's successful air campaign against the
Serbs).
54. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 2020-24 (discussing the rules
of attacking dual-use targets).
55. See, e.g., 1 Samuel 15:3 (King James) (stating that the Israelite King Saul is
told by the prophet Samuel "Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that
they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling,
ox and sheep, camel and ass"); 1 Samuel 15:22 (King James) (writing that Samuel
rebukes Saul for not following his instructions and saving the Amalekite King, and
the best of the animals, intending to use the animals for religious sacrifice).
56. See generally, HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW: THE REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 6-11 (1990) (discussing the
development of humanitarianism in armed conflicts).
57. See id. at 14 (discussing the unsuccessful attempt of the Lateran Council in
1139 to ban the use of the crossbows in warfare).
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promulgated by President Lincoln on April 24, 1863.58 Lieber's
recognition that humanitarian concerns acted as a restraint upon the
necessity of taking a specific military action reflected an emerging
norm at the time. This was followed in 1868 by the St. Petersburg's
Declaration 9 that renounced the use of exploding or inflammable
projectiles below the weight of 400 grams.60 The object of the
Declaration was to "[fix] the technical limits at which the necessities
of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity.'
This relationship between applying means and methods of warfare
to accomplish a necessary military task and the considerations of
humanity62 began to solidify in the twentieth century. This is
exemplified in Article 22 of the 1899 Hague Convention on Land
Warfare and the identical Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Convention
on Land Warfare, which demonstrate the essential relationship
58. See Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government ofArmies of the United
States in the Field, in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 13, at 3, 4, 7. Articles 4,
24, and 25 state:
Art. 4. As Martial Law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon
those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice,
honor, and humanity - virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men,
for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the
unarmed.
Art. 24. The almost universal rule in remote times was, and continues to be
with barbarous armies, that the private individual of the hostile country is
destined to suffer every privation of liberty and protection, and every
disruption of family ties. Protection was, and still is with the uncivilized
people, the exception.
Art. 25. In modem regular wars of the Europeans, and their descendants in
other portions of the globe, protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile
country is the rule; privation and disturbance of private relations are the
exceptions.
Id. at 4, 6.
59. See St. Petersburg's Declaration, supra note 20, at 95-97 (renouncing the
use of explosive projectiles under 400 grams during war).
60. See id. at 96 (enumerating the obligations of the parties under the
Declaration).
61. See id.
62. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 1389 (explaining that the law
of armed conflict reflects the balance between military necessity and humanity).
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between military and humanitarian considerations.63 The signatories
to these treaties agreed to what has become a foundational principle
of customary international law; "[t]he right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. '64 This foundational
principle was supplemented by what is known as the Martens clause,
found in the preambles of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions.65
The Martens clause is significant because it describes the
relationship between military methods and humanity, making it clear
that if not constrained by a specific provision of the law of armed
conflict, a commander is free to exercise military discretion, but only
within the general bounds of international law.66 Therefore, a
commander's decision concerning military necessity allows the use
of military means on targets indispensable for the accomplishment of
the military mission, "provided that they are not inconsistent with the
modern laws and usages of war.
67
63. See Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, July 29, 1899, art. 22, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1899]
reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 13, at 57, 76; see also Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 22, 36
Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1907], reprinted in SCHINDLER &
TOMAN, supra note 13, at 57, 76 (stating that parties must act within the bounds of
the agreement when choosing methods of injuring the enemy).
64. See id. at 76 (restricting the means of parties to injure their enemy during
war).
65. See id. at 64. The preambles of the Hague Convention of 1899 and the
Hague Convention of 1907 state:
[I]n cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants
and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience.
Id.; see also A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 6-7 (1996) (explaining
that this statement is known as the Martens Clause, named after its drafter,
Professor de Martens of the University of St. Petersburg, legal advisor to the
Russian imperial foreign ministry during the Hague conferences).
66. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 1389 (stating that the Martens
clause allows parties in a conflict to act freely within the framework of
international law, if the law of armed conflict does not formally prohibit those
acts).
67. See THOMAS E. HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND 12-13 (1908)
(asserting that "[m]ilitary necessity justifies a resort to all measures which are
indispensable for securing [the submission of the enemy]; provided that they are
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Numerous writings and international agreements throughout the
twentieth century have reinforced these principles, 68 culminating in
Article 1 of the GPI,69 and further refined by Article 35.70 Article 35,
paragraphs 1 and 2, restate, in slightly different terms, the
proscription found in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907:
"1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.
not inconsistent with the modem laws and usages of warfare," which reflects the
modem view); see also GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 1389 (stating that
"a rule of the law of armed conflict cannot be derogated from by invoking military
necessity unless this possibility is explicitly provided for by the rule in question").
68. See Rules of Land Warfare, War Department Doctrine No. 467, Office of
the Chief of Staff, approved Apr. 25, 1914 (U.S. Government Printing Office,
1917) para. 9, quoted in Telford Taylor, War Crimes, in WAR, MORALITY, AND
THE MIL. PROF. 365, 374 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 1986) (describing principles
illustrated by a 1914 United States War Department (the precursor to the
Department of Defense) Document). It states:
First, that a belligerent is justified in applying any amount and any kind of
force which is necessary for the purpose of the war; that is, the complete
submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least
expenditure of men and money. Second, the principle of humanity, which
says that all such kinds and 'degrees of violence as are not necessary for the
purpose of war are not permitted to a belligerent. Third, the principle of
chivalry, which demands a certain amount of fairness in offense and defense
and a certain mutual respect between opposing forces.
Id.
See Taylor, supra, at 374 (asserting that, other than the reference to chivalry, "this
is a plain statement of the rule of military necessity"). FM 27-10 confirms this
principle by stating:
The law of war places limits on the exercise of a belligerent's power in the
interests [of protecting both combatants and noncombatants, safeguarding
certain fundamental human rights, and facilitating the restoration of peace]
and requires that belligerents refrain from employing any kind or degree of
violence which is not actually necessary for military purposes and that they
conduct hostilities with regard for the principles of humanity and chivalry.
FM 27-10, supra note 17, para. 3.
69. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7 (stating "[i]n
cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians
and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity
and from the dictates of public conscience").
70. See id., art. 35, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21.
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2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering."71
The Commentary to GPI states that the International Committee of
the Red Cross initially wanted this provision to specifically refer to
civilians as well as combatants.72 However, it appears that this is only
done through implication of the principles of distinction, rather than
being expressly stated in either the text or the commentary.73
Regardless, a military commander must balance the military
necessity of his actions against humanitarian considerations when
determining the methods and means he will use to accomplish that
militarily necessary task.74 This is important when considering the
use of CNA in hostilities. If CNA is to be governed by traditional
law of war rules, any use of CNA as a method or means of warfare
during armed conflict must be militarily necessary and able to
comply with the principle of humanity.
D. MILITARY NECESSITY AND HUMANITY IN CNA
Though intertwined, a separate look at military necessity and
humanity, as they relate to the use of CNA, will illustrate that the
current laws of war are sufficient to guide commanders in the use of
CNA as a method or means of warfare. Any use of CNA as a method
or means of warfare during armed conflict must meet two
requirements in order to comply with the law of war.75 CNA should
first be militarily necessary" and second, it should comply with the
71. See id. art. 35, paras. 1-2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21 (providing the basic rules for
methods and means of warfare).
72. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 1410 (referring to the treaty
negotiations).
73. See id. para. 1417.
74. See id., see also supra note 30, para. 1389 (explaining the balance between
necessity and humanity).
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
76. See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Jonathan Krim, White House Officials Debating
Rules for Cyberwarfare, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2002, at 2 (quoting Mark Rasch, a
technology security consultant and former Justice Department prosecutor as
saying, "'[i]t's okay to blow up a bridge and kill everyone, including civilians' [if
the bridge is believed to serve a military purpose] . . . '[b]ut it might not be okay to
hack into computer systems' that are not obviously serving a military purpose").
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requirements of humanity, meaning that it should not cause
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury to accomplish the
military purpose." Generally, CNA capability provides an enlarged
target list that allows commanders to attack additional targets that
they may believe are militarily necessary but previously
unreachable."8 In conjunction with this expanded target list, the use
of CNA as an alternative to traditional kinetic weapons presents an
often more humane method of accomplishing the same overall
objective. 9
Discussing military necessity first, the quote at the beginning of
this paper exemplifies both the expanded target list and the balancing
a commander must do between what is militarily possible and what
is militarily necessary. 0 If the portrayal of events is true, military
commanders looked at the option CNA provided, weighed it against
the necessity of engaging the target to accomplish the war effort, and
determined that affecting Milosevic's bank accounts was not
sufficiently necessary to warrant targeting. If the attack is possible,
but not required for the war effort, it does not meet the test of
military necessity discussed below. Creating other hypothetical
situations where the commander must apply the same analysis is not
difficult.
In each case, as the commander contemplates the use of CNA, he
is required to determine, just as he would with any other target,
whether it is militarily necessary.8' Commanders must also consider
whether the war effort requires temporarily debilitating the
communication networks for the opposing force's telephone systems.
Such an action may be necessary depending on the circumstances,
77. See Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental
Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137
MIL. L. REV. 1, 31 (1992) (discussing international customary law of armed
conflict).
78. See Fulgham, supra note 5, at 30 (discussing the expansion of military
targets due to CNA).
79. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 166-67 (noting that the use of CNA and other
technology will substantially decrease civilian casualties).
80. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
81. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 1389 (explaining military
necessity of an object).
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including what planned military operation is about to be executed.
Commanders may also determine whether disabling the enemy's
email system will further the prosecution of the war. This action may
almost certainly advance the prosecution of the war, especially if
military e-mail traffic is an important part of their normal
communication methods. In contrast, using the enemy's e-mail
system to incite dissension or just intimidate the civilians of an
enemy country as an important part of offensive operations may pose
other issues.8 2 This action may be necessary if the information
campaign is a vital part of the conflict. Is shutting down a local radio
and television transmission station necessary for a victory? It is quite
possible, considering this same communications network may be
used for military radio transmissions.83 Is disrupting a commercial
shipping company's network and database a key element of a
military victory? Potentially it is, depending on whether they also
ship military goods.
Similar analysis may be made concerning the numerous other
dual-use CNA targets, such as petroleum distribution networks,
power distribution networks, computer information exchange
networks, air traffic control networks, etc.84 Before continuing with
further targeting analysis, the commander must first determine that
the proposed target of the CNA meets the military necessity
requirement of the law of war. To do this, the traditional analysis is
sufficient.85 Returning to the example of Microsoft Corporation, it is
unlikely that the connection is sufficient to make Microsoft
headquarters a legitimate dual-use target. Such an attack on corporate
headquarters is unlikely to prevent military CNA experts from using
the software and capabilities of the computers they already have in
their possession to conduct a CNA though it may degrade some
82. See William Arkin & Robert Windrem, The Other Kosovo War: Baby Steps
- and Missteps -for Information Warfare, (explaining that the United States and
British information warfare specialist utilized emails, faxes, and cell phones to
intimidate Serbian plant owners who supported Milosevic), available at
http://www.msnbccom/news/607032.asp?cp I = 1 (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
83. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 2022 (listing the purpose of an
object as a defining factor for it to be a military target).
84. See Meyer, supra note 11, at 178 (noting that civilian objects can become
military targets if used for military purposes).
85. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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technical support capabilities. Therefore, it is much more difficult to
establish a definite military advantage from such an attack.
Along with this expanded target list, CNA provides a relatively
bloodless means of attack compared to traditional means of force.86 It
can accomplish similar purposes without requiring traditional kinetic
weapons and their accompanying destruction.87 In this way, it
becomes a more humane weapon system, provided it can be
appropriately limited in scope. For example, recall the case of the
railway hub located in the populated area. The commander completes
his analysis and determines that it is a militarily necessary target. His
requirement now is to balance that military necessity with the laws of
humanity and apply only the force necessary to accomplish the
mission.88 Prior to CNA capabilities, he would have to choose which,
amongst an arsenal of kinetic weapons, was best suited to
accomplish that mission. If CNA is properly employed, it may be
able to shut down the network controlling rail transport from that
depot or even disable the track switching capabilities. Thus, the
usefulness of that depot would be destroyed without any actual
physical destruction beyond a computer or network server.89
86. See Bayles, supra note 8, at 46-47 (describing CNA as the newest form of
information operations); see also Schmitt, supra note 3, at 888 (explaining that
there are many differences between cyber threats and traditional threat sources).
CNA has a very expansive definition including both defensive and offensive
information operations. See id. at 890-92.
87. See Jim Mannion, Advances in US Weaponry Will Make US-Iraq Rematch
Faster, More Intense, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 24, 2002, LEXIS Nexis
Library, CURNWS File (indicating that the United States intends to attack Iraqi
computer networks in order to corrupt files and introduce false information into the
system).
88. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (stating the legal principle of
military necessity).
89. But see Schmitt, supra note 50. The author states:
These computer network attacks (CNA) are able to cause enormous human
suffering or physical damage. Examples range from shutting down air traffic
control systems or disrupting financial networks to altering data in
computerized medical records. In that attacks are typically targeted against a
particular database or network, most CNA is extremely precise, However, it
can also be highly indiscriminate. Perhaps the best example is launching a
computer virus designed to spread randomly through an enemy's network.
The fact that it can spread so broadly is its attraction, particularly for those
facing a computer dependent foe.
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One cautionary note is necessary here. Over time, this capability
may serve to restrict the commander's options rather than increase
his potential lethality. Once the commander has shown the capability
to limit the use of kinetic force by advanced weapons technology,
some will say that he is now required under humanitarian law to
exercise that option in every case. This is analogous to the argument
with precision-guided munitions (PGMs). 90 Some have argued that if
a country has the capability to use PGMs with their pinpoint
accuracy resulting in decreased collateral damage, they are required
to do so in every instance, regardless of the increased cost and
potential effect on the mission.91 Unfortunately, as in the case with
PGMs, the commander may not always have that option available or
it may not accomplish his military mission as effectively as some
other means of warfare. The fact that a commander is capable of
using an advanced technology weapon to limit the use of force on a
militarily necessary target may not equate to the fact that it is in the
commander's best interest to do so.
Return again to the example of the rail depot. Assume that the
commander has just recently established the facts concerning the site
that now make it a militarily necessary target. Assume further that he
has information that a large shipment of military equipment is going
to be transiting that rail depot the next day. His ability to interrupt
that rail system will be significantly more effective if it can occur
before that shipment leaves the rail depot. The personnel assigned to
conduct the CNA to take down the rail depot network, however,
cannot determine if they will be able to complete their work prior to
the shipment leaving the station. When a commander has the
eventual capability, does the law of war require that he delay his
attack because his only available options would require a use of force
Id.
90. See Thomas C. Wingfield, Legal Aspects of Offensive Information
Operations in Space, 9 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (1998/1999) (quoting
John Deutch, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as saying "[t]he
electron is the ultimate precision guided munition").
91. See Danielle L. Infeld, Note, Precision Guided Munitions Demonstrated
Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But is a Country Obligated to Use
Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage, 26
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 109 (1992); Schmitt, supra note 2, at 170 (noting
that States will be subject to different standards based on their capabilities).
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in excess of what may be necessary given additional time? Surely
this would be a misuse of the law of war in constraining a
commander.
As with PGMs, the commander's use of CNA must be based on
military necessity, balanced with humanity, as the commander
perceives it at the time of the decision.92 The commander must take
into consideration his military mission, not only over the short term,
but also over the long term. He may not have the freedom to delay
his offensive for a day, nor should he be required to delay under such
circumstances. If the mission requires the offensive to be launched
the next morning, the commander must determine what time he will
have to make his decision to either use kinetic weapons or CNA. At
the point that decision must be made is the point where the
commander will apply his most appropriate weapon system to the
task. The law of war does not and should not require more
examination. This same analysis is of vital significance in analyzing
the potential issue of "knock on" effects discussed in Part II below.
E. PROPORTIONALITY
Once a commander has determined that a target is a military
objective and that it is militarily necessary, he must attack that target
in a way that will not conflict with the rule of proportionality. The
rule of proportionality is "an attempt to balance the conflicting
military and humanitarian interests (or to balance military necessity
and humanity) and is most evident in connection with the reduction
of incidental damage caused by military operations.
93
"Proportionality limits the amount of force that can be used to
destroy a military objective to that which does not cause unnecessary
collateral destruction of civilian property or unnecessary human
suffering of civilians." 94 Even if the target is legitimate, the attacker
is required to adjust his means and methods of attack so that the
92. See Matthew Lippman, Conundrums ofArmed Conflict: Criminal Defenses
to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 63 (1996)
(commenting on the Rendulic case discussed further in this paper); see also infra.
Part II.C.
93. See Rogers, supra note 65, at 14 (defining the legal use of proportionality).
94. See Sharp, supra note 3, at 40 (discussing the law of conflict management
and collateral damage to civilians).
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destruction or death of the target does not include or cause a chain of
events that will lead to the death of civilians or destruction of civilian
property that is excessive to the concrete and direct military
advantage to be gained.95 If he cannot sufficiently limit the expected
result, he is required to refrain from the attack.96 This requirement of
proportionality therefore, affects not only the type of weapons used
or means of warfare, but also the effects of that use or method.
9 7
It is important to note here that the rule of proportionality only
applies to civilians and civilian property.98 It is not an attempt to
ensure a "fair fight" between combatants. 99 In other words, there is
no requirement that a combatant limit his force when engaging
another combatant. The rule of proportionality will only affect an
attack between combatants to the degree that civilians may suffer
incidental injury, or civilian property may become collateral damage
as a result of that attack. 00 However, it does not preclude the attack.
Rather, it requires the commander to balance the potential death or
injury to civilians, the damage to civilian property, and the military
necessity of destroying that military target against the potential
damage and destruction to civilians and civilian objects.'0l
95. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 57, para. 2(a)(ii), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 30
(mandating that attackers take reasonable precautions to minimize harm to
civilians).
96. See id. para. 2(a)(iii) (directing refrain from attack if the expectation of
civilian harm is excessive).
97. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 393 (indicating that in addition to adhering to
the rule of proportionality, attackers must choose methods that cause the least
collateral damage).
98. See Schmitt, supra note 50 (discussing the various dilemmas associated
with the rule of proportionality including the balance between civilian suffering
and military advantage).
99. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 169 (describing the fact that the rule of
proportionality "makes civilian shields appealing").
100. See id. (discussing the limits of proportionality).
101. See Sharp, supra note 3, at 40-41 (noting that if civilians support the war
effort, they will be subject to incidental damage provided that the military
objective is lawful).
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This principle is codified in Article 51 of GPI. After prohibiting
indiscriminate attacks, 02 paragraph (5)(b) gives the following
example of a prohibited indiscriminate attack: "an attack which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."'' 03 This provision is echoed in Article
57(2)(a)(iii), which requires those planning attacks to "refrain from
deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
104
The test for whether the destruction of a civilian object offers a
definite military advantage is also found in the GPI Commentary. 105
In discussing what test must be met to satisfy the "concrete and
direct military advantage," the Commentary says, "[a] military
advantage can only consist in ground gained and in annihilating or
weakening the enemy armed forces. In addition, it should be noted
that the words 'concrete and direct' impose stricter conditions on the
attacker than those implied by the criteria defining military
objectives in Article 52.' '1°6
Returning to the example of the rail depot, as the commander is
determining how to strike the depot, he must ascertain his
expectations of the attack. Once he has done that, he must determine
if the expected incidental injury or damage to civilian objects is
excessive to the military advantage of destroying that rail hub and
military equipment. While this is a necessarily subjective decision, 107
102. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 51, para. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26 (prohibiting
indiscriminate attacks).' .. .
103. See id. art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26; see also Matheson, supra note 21, at
426 (reporting that the United States accepts Article 51 as customary international
law, except the provision dealing with civilian reprisal).
104. See GPI, supra note 21, Article 57, para. 2(a)(iii), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 30.
105. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 2024, 2218 (describing the
test for military advantage of the destruction of civilian objects).
106. See id. para. 2218.
107. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 150-51 (explaining that the decision is multi-
tiered and complex).
1172 [18:1145
A TTA CKS ON COMPUTER NETWORKS
it is one the commander must determine. In the case of the rail yard,
it may be that the military portion of the depot is sufficiently
segregated and there will be very limited effects on non-combatants.
On the other hand, as it is a dual-use object, it may be that the
commander will expect significant damage to civilian objects. If the
damage is excessive to the military advantage gained, he must refrain
from the attack.
Though proportionality is often spoken of in terms of what
weapons systems are used in the attack, the focus should be on
minimizing collateral damage around a necessary military target. 108
Often, the means to limit such damage is the use of different
weapons systems, such as PGMs, which are designed to accomplish
such a goal. The U.S. position is that the law does not require
advanced nations like the United States to use vastly more expensive
weapons systems, such as PGMs, in order to comply with the rule of
proportionality. °9 The GPI Commentary, however, does not appear
to agree with this view. In commenting on Article 48, the
Commentary states "it is reprehensible for a Party possessing [means
and methods of warfare capable of distinguishing between military
and civilians] not to use them, and thus consciously prevent itself
from making the required distinction."' 1 0 As mentioned in connection
with military necessity and humanity, this disagreement is likely to
only get more significant with the increased use of CNA.
F. PROPORTIONALITY IN CNA
A commander's requirement to comply with the rule of
proportionality will often lead him to use CNA as an alternative to
traditional kinetic weapons, due to its lack of inherent destruction. In
many cases, CNA may be the weapon that will accomplish the
mission, while causing the least amount of collateral damage.
108. See Rogers, supra, note 65, at 15.
109. See DEP'T OF DEF. OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 14, at 22
(arguing that in the case of protracted conflict, a military force would quickly
exhaust its supply of PGMs if it used them whenever possible). But see Schmitt,
supra note 2, at 152 (asserting that guided munitions should be used if they are
readily available and would lessen expected loss and damages).
110. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 2600.
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The availability of computer network attack actually increases the options
for minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury. Whereas in the
past physical destruction may have been necessary to neutralize a target's
contribution to the enemy's efforts, now it may be possible to simply
"turn it off." For instance, rather than bombing an airfield, air traffic
control can be interrupted. The same is true of power production and
distribution systems, communications, industrial plants, and so forth.
Those who plan and execute such operations must still be concerned
about collateral damage, incidental injury and knock-on effects, but the
risks associated with conducting classic kinetic warfare are mitigated
significantly through CNA. Also, depending on the desired result, it may
be possible to simply interrupt operation of the target facility. This tactic
would be particularly attractive in the case of dual-use objectives.
II
CNA is an attractive alternative to a kinetic attack when
considering compliance with the rule of proportionality due to its
physical characteristics of blast and fragmentation and lack of heat,
combined with the increasing dependence and corresponding
vulnerability on computer networks." 2 CNA will be perceived as a
less destructive use of force, in most cases, causing less collateral
damage than kinetic weapons that accomplish the same task."3
Depending on the target, it will likely result in fewer injuries and
deaths, limited physical destruction, and a quicker recovery after
hostilities cease.'4
For example, degrading the rail transport system by kinetic
weapons and CNA will have the same effect on the ability for
military units to communicate point to point; but doing so with CNA
will allow the physical structures to remain intact, including civilian
objects and the building where civilian workers are located. It may
not require damage to any trains or tracks, but it will still stop all rail
movement. Similar analysis is true of the electronic power grids,
transportation systems, and many other computer accessible systems
that may be valid targets under the law of war. In most cases, in
comparison with kinetic weapons on like targets, a resort to CNA
I 1. Schmitt, supra note 7, at 394.
112. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 166 (noting the positive aspects of the CNA in
regards to proportionality).
113. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 394 (discussing how the CNA is a less
destructive force then the more traditional weapons).
114. See id. (explaining further the benefits of using CNA weapons).
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will more effectively comply with the rule of proportionality. The
instance where this is most likely not true is that of unintended
consequences as will be discussed in Part II.
G. SUMMARY OF CNA AND THE LAWS OF WAR
CNA presents new targets and additional means of attacking
traditional targets. This expansion of the commander's potential
target list has caused some to cast doubt on the ability of the
commander to adequately apply the traditional principles of
distinction, military necessity and humanity, and proportionality
when using CNA. This concern is unwarranted. Applying the
traditional analysis, including GPI's definition of military objective,
gives the commander sufficient guidance to determine whether the
location, purpose, or use of civilian or dual-use objects make them a
legitimate military objective."1 5 Further, the current requirement to
balance military necessity and humanity is sufficient in the context of
CNA to guide a commander, particularly given the humane results of
many proposed CNAs. 116 Finally, CNA will allow a commander, in
many cases, to reduce even further the collateral damage to civilian
objects and human suffering to civilian populations.117 The advanced
technological capabilities provided by CNA do not confront the
commander with irresolvable legal issues. Rather, a correct
application of the traditional analysis will expand the number of
options available and allow the commander the freedom he needs to
accomplish his legitimate military mission, while adequately
protecting non-combatants from the destruction of war. 118
II. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS AND "KNOCK-ON"
EFFECTS
A military commander faced with the decision of attacking a target
with CNA assets must conduct the same legal analysis as if attacking
115. See supra Part I.B.
116. See supra Part I.D.
117. See supra Part I.F.
118. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 378 (stating that traditional means remain
while CNA allows for advances in technology to increase those means).
2003] 1175
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
that target with traditional kinetic weapons." 9 The same law of war
principles apply despite the use of advanced technology. 20 As
discussed above, these principles give the commander guidance on
whether he can conduct such an attack and how he may execute it.
An area that deserves more detailed treatment, however, is that of
"knock-on" effects or unexpected consequences. 2' These are
119. See Rogers, supra note 65, at 69-70 (giving the obligations for a traditional
kinetic attack). The obligations for a traditional kinetic attack are:
1. When planning military operations always take into account the effect they
will have on the civilian population and. civilian objects, including the
environment.
2. Do everything feasible to verify that the target is a military objective.
3. Take all feasible precautions to reduce incidental damage and loss. This
will involve a careful choice of weapons as well as care in preparing the plans
for carrying out the attack.
4. Observe the rule of proportionality. This requires a calculation of the likely
casualties, both military and civilian, and damage compared with the expected
military advantage. It is probably too early to say whether it also involves an
assessment of the risk and effect of weapons malfunctioning or of human
error but it certainly does not include matters over which the attacker has no
control such as the effect of enemy action. Obviously factors such as air
supremacy of the availability of smart weapons will weigh heavily in favour
of taking precautions to protect the civilian population.
5. Be ready to cancel or suspend an attack, if necessary. This also involves
weighing military against humanitarian considerations.
6. Give warnings, unless circumstances do not permit.
7. Consider carefully his choice of targets in terms of what offers the best
military advantage with the least incidental loss or damage.
8. Ensure that target lists are kept constantly under review in the light of
changing circumstances.
Id. at 70 (citations omitted).
120. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 378 (emphasizing that the "prescriptive
architecture" remains the same despite CAN). But see Rogers, supra note 65, at
69-70 (arguing that "information warfare," including computer network attack,
represents a "revolution in military affairs" that will "challenge existing doctrine
on the waging of war, necessitate a revised concept of battle space and expand the
available methods and means of warfare"). "Of particular note will be the impact
of information warfare on the principles of international humanitarian law - and
vice versa." Id. at 365.
121. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Virtuous Warrior in a Savage World, 8 U.S.
A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 88 (1997/1998) (explaining the role of the military
leader in conflict); see also Frank J. Cilluffo et al., Bad Guys and Good Stuff"
When and Where Will the Cyber Threats Converge?, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 131,
139-40 (1999/2000) (stating that there are many unintended problems that need to
be accounted for, including cyberthreats).
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consequences from an attack, known as second and third tier effects
that were not accounted for in the planning stages of the attack, but
occur due to some unexpected agent or circumstance. 122 While this is
equally applicable in the realm of kinetic attack, it has special
significance when conducting CNA due to the nature of such
operations.123 This difficulty is highlighted when considering the
object of the attack or distinction, and the collateral effects of the
attack or proportionality. 
124
Consider the commander who is contemplating a CNA. His
situation is not unlike the commander referred to earlier who is
contemplating a kinetic attack against a dual-use rail depot. He
knows the rail depot is a military objective, but also that it is in a
populated civilian portion of a town. In an effort to avoid collateral
damage, he determines a CNA on the rail transport network is more
appropriate. In conducting his proportionality analysis, he needs to
determine exactly what will be the secondary and tertiary results of
that rail yard shut down.'25 For example, that same network that
controls the rail switching may also control some other system or
services. Thus, the commander must answer the following questions.
By shutting down the switching system, what will be the effects on
incoming trains that are trying to enter the station? Similarly, will the
shut down have an effect on trains not associated with this specific
122. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 51, para. 5(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26 (using the
term "expected" in relation to the consequences that need to be analyze). While
this term is sometimes used interchangeably with the terms "unanticipated
consequences" and "higher order effects," the proper legal term should be
"unexpected consequences." Id.
123. See Wingfield, supra, note 90, at 138 (stating that in offensive information
operations there may be unintended consequences); see also Schmitt, supra note 3,
at 894 (describing CNA system interaction as sometimes random, unsynchronized,
and unanticipated).
124. See Schmitt, supra note 50 (explaining the concept of proportionality).
Another false dilemma is the problem of reverberating effects... Should the
second, third, fourth, and fifth tier effects of an attack on a legitimate target be
considered when calculating proportionality? Of course they should.., it
simply does not matter whether incidental injury and collateral damage is a
first or fourth tier effect. It must be included in the proportionality calculation.
Id.
125. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (applying the terms second and
third tier damage to a CNA attack).
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rail depot that is the commander's target? If so, what are those
expected effects? Depending on the answers to these questions, the
use of one kinetic weapon to destroy the rail depot may result in
fewer deaths or injuries to civilians over the long term than does the
CNA that shuts down the power supply maintaining that system.
In the broader picture, this becomes problematic as a commander
tries to quantify "incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated." '126 When using kinetic weapons, determining, at least in
the short term, what injury and damage will occur can be much
clearer. This may not be so clear in relation to CNA. 127 Commanders
contemplating a use of CNA, particularly in relation to targets
uniquely susceptible to CNA, should carefully weigh this
consideration before authorizing an attack.
A. UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES, DISTINCTION AND
PROPORTIONALITY
The rule of distinction has been explained in Part I,128 but attention
was drawn to the fact that while the attacker may intend his CNA to
be limited to a military objective, he may not have taken sufficient
precautions or may be incapable of ensuring that his attack does not
go beyond its intended target.' 29 This situation is highlighted by the
following example in a recent article. 30 Assume an attacker has
decided to plant a disabling computer virus into an enemy's military
network. The article's author argues that though the virus is capable
of being targeted at the military network,
[s]uch code may be indiscriminate in that its effects cannot be limited. In
many cases, once a viral code is launched against a target computer or
network, the attacker will have no way to limit its subsequent
retransmission. This may be true even in a closed network, for the virus
126. GPI, supra note 21, art. 51(5)(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
127. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 375-78 (explaining the complexities of
computer network attack targets).
128. See supra Part I.A-B.
129. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
130. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 389.
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could, for instance, be transferred into it by diskette. Simply put, a
malicious code likely to be uncontrollably spread throughout civilian
systems is prohibited as an indiscriminate weapon. 131
The author's point that "a malicious code likely to be
uncontrollably spread throughout civilian systems is prohibited as an
indiscriminate weapon '  will not receive much argument. The
validity of that statement, however, depends on the word "likely."
The example of a virus being transferred from a closed military
network by diskette, with no intention or volition of the attacker, that
subsequently infected civilian systems is more problematic. Is the
legal standard that an attack is a violation of the law of war if it is
"likely" to spread to unintended targets? Or, as intimated in the
quote, is it a violation if unintended spread is "possible?"
B. THE "MAY BE EXPECTED" STANDARD
The misunderstanding or misapplication of the legal standard in
CNO may prevent the valid use of CNO tools in armed conflict.
There is no special standard for CNO, nor should there be. The same
standard applies and provides sufficient guidance when considering
the potential for "knock-on" effects or unexpected consequences.
That standard is found in GPI Articles 51 and 57 of GPI. Article 51,
paragraph 5(b) states:
Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate: an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
to civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated.133
Note that the standard here is what may be "expected," not what is
likely or possible, or even what is foreseeable. 13 4
131. Id. at 389.
132. Id. (arguing the dangers of unexpected consequences on CNA attack).
133. GPI, supra note 21, art. 51, para. 5(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26 (emphasis
added).
134. See Bayles, supra note 8, at 53 (explaining the concepts ofjus in bello and
proportionality); see also Schmitt, supra note 7, at 374 (stating that sporadic or
isolated actions are not covered under humanitarian law).
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This same standard is repeated in GPI Article 57, paragraph
2(a)(iii). In discussing precautions in attack, it states:
With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: those
who plan or decide upon an attack shall refrain from deciding to launch
any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.1
3 5
As before, the legal standard is what injury to civilians or damage
to civilian objects is "expected" to occur.'36
The GPI Commentary to the above-quoted Articles focuses on the
meaning of "concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."' 37
Yet, there are two very important comments that shed some light on
the meaning of the word "expected" in this situation. The first
highlights some of the discussion that went into choosing this
specific language.
Some would have preferred the words 'which risks causing' rather than
'which may be expected to cause.' Committee III adopted the present
wording ... Despite these clarifications, the provision allows for a fairly
broad margin of judgment, as stated above; several delegations regretfully
stressed this fact. In contrast, other delegations commended the fact that
in future military commanders would have a universally recognized
guideline as regards their responsibilities to the civilian population during
attacks against military objectives.'
38
While these are only words, and words carry different meanings
for different people, it seems clear that the final language was less
restrictive than the proposed language. Had the words "which risks
causing" been accepted, the standard would be closer to what is
"likely" or even what is "possible." It seems clear, however, that by
prohibiting attacks "which may be expected" to cause collateral
135. See GPI, supra note 21, at art. 57, para. 2a(iii), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 30
(emphasis added).
136. Seeid. art. 51, para. 5(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
137. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 2209-10.
138. See id.
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damage, 139 the international community has allowed the military
commander more discretion in his attacks.
The second applicable provision in the Commentary is a more
general comment addressing the commander's use of discretion,
"[e]ven if this system is based to some extent on a subjective
evaluation, the interpretation must above all be a question of
common sense and good faith for military commanders."'
140
Therefore, the commander's requirement is to exercise good faith in
determining what injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects
maybe expected to occur from his attack. This standard of good faith
is clarified in what is known as the Rendulic Rule.'
41
C. THE RENDULIC RULE
In June 1944, Generaloberst (United States equivalent of a 4-star
General) 42 Lothar Rendulic was appointed as the Commander In
Chief of the 201 Mountain Army, stationed in Scandinavia. Along its
Eastern front, Rendulic's forces were spread from the Arctic Ocean
in the north to central Finland in the south. In September of 1944,
Finland signed a separate peace agreement with Russia that included
the requirement for German troops to withdraw from Finland within
fourteen days, a distance of over 1000 kilometers for the southern
most German units. This withdrawal ended up being a hard-fought
movement against oncoming Russian soldiers.1
4 1
139. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 51, para 5(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
140. Id. para. 2208.
141. See infra Part II.C.
142. See United States v. von Leeb, XI Trials Of War Criminals Before The
Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 703 (1950)
(providing a table of comparative ranks of U.S. Army, German Army, U.S. Navy,
German Navy, SS and Civilian Officials in Legal Departments of German Armed
Forces).
143. See United States v. Wilhelm List, XI Trials Of War Criminals Before The
Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1295 (1950)
(explaining the circumstances around Rendulic's time as the appointed commander
in chief of the 20th Mountain Army in Lapland).
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As part of this contested withdrawal, General Rendulic ordered a
"scorched earth"' 44 policy in the Norwegian province of Finmark.
This policy was based on General Rendulic's understanding of the
situation at the time, that he was being pursued by "excellent
[Russian] troops" along several land and sea routes. 45  The
Nuremburg court clearly stated that, in judging the legality of a
commander's actions, the standard was what the military commander
believed to be true at the time, not the actual facts. 146
There is evidence in the record that there was no military necessity for
this destruction and devastation. An examination of the facts in retrospect
can well sustain this conclusion. But we are obliged to judge the situation
as it appeared to the defendant at the time. If the facts were such as would
justify the action by the exercise of judgment, after giving consideration
to all factors and existing possibilities, even though the conclusion
reached may have been faulty, it cannot be said to be criminal.147
In this case, despite the extreme destruction General Rendulic
ordered, the Court concluded, "[a]fter giving careful consideration to
all the evidence on the subject, we are convinced that the defendant
cannot be held criminally responsible although when viewed in
retrospect, the danger did not actually exist."'48
144. Id. at 1295-96 (describing the "scorched earth" policy). The evidence at
Rendulic's trial indicated that:
Villages were destroyed. Isolated habitations met a similar fate. Bridges and
highways were blasted. Communication lines were destroyed. Port
installations were wrecked. A complete destruction of all housing
communication, and transport facilities took place. This was not only true
along the coast and highways but in the interior sections as well. The
destruction was as complete as an efficient army could do it. Three years after
the devastation was discernible to the eye.
Id. at 1296.
145. See id. at 1295-96 (stating that the evidence at trial demonstrated that the
Russian troops were of excellent caliber).
146. See id. (stating the standard of review for the rule of military necessity).
147. Id. at 1296.
148. Id. The Court continued:
We are not called upon to determine whether urgent military necessity for the
devastation and destruction in the province of Finmark actually existed. We
are concerned with the question whether the defendant at the time of its
occurrence acted within the limits of honest judgment on the basis of the
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The standard the Court held General Rendulic to was the
requirement to give "consideration to all factors and existing
possibilities" as they "appeared to the defendant at the time."' 4 9
While the specific facts of the case dealt with General Rendulic's
decision concerning the military necessity of his action, the Court's
reasoning reflects that this standard is not confined to solely that
decision, but would also apply to a commander's decision
contemplated in GPI Articles 51 and 57. 110 This is the same standard
with which military commanders contemplating the use of CNA
must comply.
Note that the requirement to give consideration to all factors and
existing possibilities is balanced with the overarching constraint of
taking facts as they appear at the time of the decision.15 Must the
commander remain in inaction until he feels he has turned over every
stone in search of that last shred of information concerning all factors
and possibilities that might affect his decision? The answer must be
"no." Instead, he must act in good faith and, in accordance with GPI,
do everything feasible to get this information.
D. EVERYTHING FEASIBLE
GPI Article 57, paragraph 2 states:
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special
protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2
of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol
to attack them;
conditions prevailing at the time. The course of a military operation by the
enemy is loaded with uncertainties ... It is our considered opinion that the
conditions, as they appeared to the defendant at the time were sufficient upon
which he could honestly conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the
decision made. This being true, the defendant may have erred in the exercise
of his judgment but he was guilty of no criminal act. We find the defendant
not guilty on this portion of the charge.
Id. at 1297.
149. See id.
150. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 51, 57, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 30.
151. See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
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(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects1
5 2
This requirement of doing everything feasible underlies the
Rendulic Rule.'53 Once a commander has done everything feasible to
gather information and learn the specific circumstances of the object
of his attack, he can rely on those facts in taking action.
In the world of CNO, the practical question becomes feasibility. In
the technologically advanced world of CNO, feasibility is really
about what computer operations can legitimately be conducted to
learn the intelligence needed to make an informed decision. Ignoring
this paper's assumption that the attacker is already -involved in
international armed conflict with an enemy, a particular action will
likely not be as feasible prior to the onset of hostilities as it will be
once hostilities have commenced. This is true because some legal
uses of CNO allowing the collection of helpful information prior to
an attack, may constitute a use of force under the United Nations
Charter and initiate the premature onset of hostilities between the
two nations.'54 In contrast, as this paper assumes, once the attacker is
in international armed conflict with an enemy, the feasible scope of
CNO is much broader. Hostilities are already commenced between
the nations and the commander need not worry whether his actions
will cross the threshold of a use of force. Rather, he is only
constrained by what is legal and what is technologically possible.'55
Returning once again to the example of the rail depot, if the
commander wants to use CNA as opposed to bombing the rail hub,
he must take feasible precautions before initiating that attack to
ensure that any expected loss of civilian life or damage to civilian
property is not excessive to the concrete and direct military
advantage to be gained. 56 Some of these feasible precautions may
152. GPI, supra note 21, Article 57, paras. 2a(i) and (ii), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 30
(emphasis added).
153. See supra Part II.C.
154. See supra note 3 (discussing CNA as a use of force prior to hostilities).
155. See supra Part I (discussing the laws of war).
156. See GPI COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 1389 (defining military
necessity).
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include mapping the network,1 57 or creating an accurate picture of the
computer network that will be attacked to ensure that the attack can
be controlled and that the attacker knows all the systems that will be
affected. 58 By doing this, the commander will be able to ascertain
what other effects are expected from his attack. Further, the structure
of the network may affect the CNA tool he uses to accomplish his
purpose. If the rail network is isolated, a different tool can be used
than if the network is highly interconnected. The commander may
also monitor the traffic that travels along the network to try and
determine volume levels and attempt to determine the location of
157. See Michael C. Sirak, Threat to the Nets, A.F. MAG., Oct. 2001, at 24
(explaining the Department of Defense Computer Network Defense system); see
also William Arkin & Robert Windrem, The U.S. China Information War: Major
Headaches, Aug.' 20, 2001 (claiming that the first step information warfare defense
is mapping the networks of the opponent), available at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/607031.asp#BODY (last visited Mar. 26, 2003);
Mannion, supra note 87 (quoting Andrew Krepinevich, director of the Center for
Budgetary and Strategic Assessments as saying, "[w]e may not know about the use
of information warfare for years after this war happens because it is shrouded in
secrecy, but I think that another Way they are going to go after [Saddam Hussein's]
ability to exercise control over his forces"). Specific capabilities are not only
beyond the scope of this paper, but are also mostly classified. See id.; cf Bill
Gertz, High Tech Warfare, Beijing's Strategy Targets Taiwan's Information
Networks, WASH. TIMES, July 22, 2001, at A3 (discussing some potential cyber
weapons and tactics in a future war)
158. See GPI, supra note 21, Art. 36, 1125 U.N.T.S. 21. No attempt is made in
this paper to discuss the actual means, or tools, by which the attack would take
place. It is sufficient to mention that Article 36 of GPI states:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or
method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to
determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be
prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable
to the High Contracting Party.
Id.; see also Lt. Col Elizabeth Kelly, Bullet Background Paper on Cancellation of
DOD 5000 Series Publications, Sept. 17, 2002 (on file with the author) (noting that
the publications, Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 and Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.2, where this requirement was codified were canceled on
September 30, 2002). The Department of Defense publications are expected to be
reissued in the near future containing the same requirement. See also Air Force
Instruction 51-402 (demonstrating that The Services generally have similar
requirements in their own regulations), available at http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/5 1/aft51-402/afi51-402.pdf (last visited Mar. 26,
2003).
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protective firewalls. 59 The important point is that a commander is
required only to do what is feasible, given the prevailing
circumstances, including the time he has to make a decision and the
amount of information he has during that time.
E. AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION TO SEGREGATE
160
Additionally, it is important to note that GPI Article 58(b) places
an affirmative obligation for nations to segregate civilian objects and
populations from military objectives.
The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible:
(a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to
remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects
under their control from the vicinity of military objectives;
(b)avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated
areas;
(c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the
dangers resulting from military operations.1
6 1
Though this requirement appears problematic in the internet
sphere, the obligation still remains. As written above, paragraphs (a)
and (b) deal with the destination of the attack and removing civilian
lines of communication from the required segregation.'62 Therefore,
as long as a nation does not so closely tie civilian and military
networks that an attack cannot affect one without similarly affecting
the other, it is in compliance with the law. This known international
legal requirement may assist the commander in situations where his
intelligence is limited and he has to base his decision on little
information. 1
63
159. William B. Scott, CINCSPACE: Focus More on Space Control, 153
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., 80 (2000) (explaining the complexities of
developing a CNA because of the constant evolution of technology).
160. See Rogers, supra note 65, at 71-83 (providing an excellent general
discussion of the obligation to segregate military objects from civilian objects).
161. GPI, supra note 21, art. 58, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 31.
162. See id. (listing the necessary precautions to be taken prior to an attack).
163. But see Schmitt, supra note 2, at 169 (arguing that a nation's ability to
conduct precision engagement, including CNA, may encourage enemy nations to
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F. SUMMARY
As commanders consider the expanded target list offered by CNA
capabilities, there is the possibility for violations of the principle of
distinction and the rule of proportionality, particularly when
accounting for potential secondary, tertiary, or "knock-on" effects.
164
While this consideration may have some unique aspects in CNO, it is
based on the same law and principles that apply to all military
operations. The commander need not base his decision on what the
"possible," "likely," or even "foreseeable" effects will be of his
attack. Rather, the international law standard for CNO is that a
commander may use CNA if he, in good faith, believes that the
damage to civilian objects and injury to civilians expected from the
attack, given the circumstances as known to him at the time after
taking all feasible measures to ascertain those circumstances, is not
excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.'65
CONCLUSION
The law of war clearly applies to the use of CNA in armed
conflict. CNA not only provides the commander with increased
capability to hit already reachable targets, but it also provides an
expanded list of targets available to attack. 166 There is no legal gap
that prevents a commander from analyzing the law and then applying
these capabilities in armed conflict. By applying the standard
principles of the law of war, including distinction, the application of
methods and means of warfare by balancing military necessity and
humanity, and the rule of proportionality, a commander will come to
the correct application of these weapons systems regardless of the
targets CNA provides, to include dual-use targets.'67
The risk of secondary and tertiary effects that should serve as no
roadblock to the increased use of CNA, provided the standard legal
violate this rule in order to provide protection to assets that may not be otherwise
protectable against a technologically superior opponent).
164. See supra Part II.A.
165. See supra Part II.C-D.
166. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting the increased number of
available targets for the CNA).
167. See supra Part I.
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analysis is completed by the commander, keeping in mind the
Rendulic Rule and the feasibility requirement.'68 Compliance with
this internationally grounded standard will ensure the legality of
CAN, while allowing the commander the flexibility to utilize this
effective tool to accomplish his mission.
168. See supra Part II.C-D.
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